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ESSAYS
Debating the Proper Role of National Law
under the New York Arbitration Convention
Thomas Carbonneau*
One of the many consequences of the progressive development of
globalization apparently has been to incite a vigorous debate among
leading members of the international arbitral community about the role of
national law in implementing the enforcement regime of the New York
Arbitration Convention (Convention).' The debate was provoked by
federal court rulings in two recent cases: Chromalloy Aeroservices v.
Arab Republic of Egypt (Chromalloy)2 and Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R"
Us (Toys "R" Us).3 Prior to these opinions, there appeared to have been
an implicit consensus in the international community regarding the
"anational" character of the Convention.4
Both cases involve the Convention's setting aside procedure and the
interpretation of the role of national law in applying that procedure. In
particular, the questions addressed are: in Chromalloy, whether U.S.
domestic arbitration law should have the effect of sustaining the
transborder enforceability of an international award that has been nullified
under the national law of the place of rendition; and, in Toys "R" Us,
whether U.S. domestic arbitration law should govern the enforceability of
an international award rendered in the United States. Despite the
similarities in the substantive dimension of the cases, the courts arrived at
opposite assessments of the function of U.S. domestic law in the
Convention's enforcement framework. The radical contrast in the
gravamen of the opinions implies contradistinctive concepts of the
* Professor of Law, Tulane University, and Editor in Chief of the World Arbitration and
Mediation Report.
1. United Nations Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, codified in 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-208
(1970) (hereinafter Convention].
2. 939 F Supp. 907 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
3. 126 E3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997) (the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for
certiorari in Toys "R" Us in February 1998).
4. See THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
ch. 11 (1997).
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importance of national law and of the function and standing of the
Convention.
I. ThE CHROMALLOY OPINION
In Chromalloy, a U.S. company-Chromalloy Aeroservices, Inc.-
entered into a military procurement contract with the Egyptian Air Force
for the supply, maintenance, and repair of helicopters. The Egyptian
Government unilaterally terminated the contract, and the parties entered
into a lengthy arbitration. Pursuant to the arbitration agreement, the
arbitration took place in Egypt and was governed by Egyptian law. An
award was rendered that was subsequently nullified by the Court of
Appeals in Cairo. Focusing upon the specific provisions of the contract,
the Egyptian court determined that the arbitrators had applied the wrong
substantive (namely, non-Egyptian) law. Chromalloy then petitioned the
federal district court for the District of Columbia to enforce the award
pursuant to the Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).5
In its opinion, the court acknowledged that it was addressing a
matter of first impression6 in the U.S. decisional on arbitration: whether a
U.S. court, applying the Convention, should enforce an international
arbitral award that has been set aside by a court at the place of rendition.
Responding to the argument of the Egyptian Government, the court
observed that article V(1)(e) of the Convention provides for the
nonenforcement of awards that have been set aside at the place of
rendition. ' The court, however, stated that the language of article V was
permissive and, therefore, established a "discretionary standard."8 By
contrast, the language of article VII of the Convention was mandatory and
required the maintenance of a party's domestic law rights to the
enforcement of awards. Article VII provides that: "The provisions of the
present Convention shall not deprive any interested party of any right he
may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the
extent allowed by the law ... of the country where such award is sought
to be relied upon."9  In the court's view, "under the Convention,
[Chromalloy] ... maintains all rights to the enforcement of this arbitral
award that it would have in the absence of the Convention."'0
5. See Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 908.
6. See id.
7. Article V(1)(e) provides that recognition and enforcement may be refused if: "The
award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made."
8. See Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 909.
9. See Convention, supra note 1.
10. Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 910.
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Furthermore, the court deemed that the award would be enforceable
under the FAA's deferential review standard."
The Egyptian Court of Appeals' setting aside of the award thereby
became a foreign judgment, the enforcement of which no longer
implicated the Convention, but rather involved the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, various other federal law statutory provisions pertaining
to venue and jurisdiction, and the common law applying to the
enforcement of foreign judgments.' 2  The court concluded that the
enforcement of the Egyptian court judgment would "violate" a "clear
U.S. public policy [,]" namely, the "[unmistakable] public policy in favor
of final and binding arbitration of commercial disputes.... The court
rejected the Egyptian Government's arguments based on international
comity, the parties' contractual choice-of-law, and the would-be conflict
between the Convention and the FAA 14 to conclude that: (1) "the award
*- is valid as a matter of U.S. law"; and (2) "it need not grant res judicata
effect to the decision of the Egyptian Court of Appeal....""
The result of the opinion is justifiable in terms of the pragmatic ethic
that governs international commercial litigation: it preserves the
effectiveness of the transborder enforcement of international arbitral
awards. The doctrinal foundation of the opinion, however, is more
questionable. The court's strained interpretation of article V as
establishing a merely "discretionary standard' ' 16 for enforcement
contradicts prior decisional assumptions and practices, and is not
supported by the restrictive character of the grounds for review contained
in article V. Further, the exercise of would-be judicial discretion under
article V could destabilize the transborder framework for enforcement
established by the Convention. Moreover, the meaning and effect that the
court affixes to the language of article VII could not have been part of the
intent of the drafters of the Convention and has not been part of the
contemporary decisional practice under the Convention. The court's
construction implies that the Convention's enforcement regime could be
undermined at any time and in any circumstance by national legal
provisions. Evaluated from the standard point of the orderliness and
stability of governing norms, the court's tendancious interpretative
pragmatism renders the Convention framework chaotic. The proper
11. See id
12. Seeid. at911-12.
13. Id. at 913.
14. See id. at913-14.
15. Id. at 914.
16. See id. at 909.
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function of national law under the Convention is elusive, becomes unclear
and unpredictable, and could generate counterproductive results.
According to the Convention's legislative history and express
language, national law does have an unmistakable role in the operation of
the Convention's enforcement regime." For example, national law
should play a controlling role in the determination of some enforcement
questions-in particular, a disabling role when it results in the setting
aside of an award. Yet, according to the Chromalloy court, the national
law of the place of enforcement can be used to supplant and supercede the
Convention's express provisions by negating the effect of another national
law used to set aside an international award.'8  The national law of the
enforcement jurisdiction thereby becomes the vehicle for the expression
of an international policy on arbitration and the enforcement of
international arbitral awards embodied in, but refuted by, the express
provisions of the Convention. Pursuing this irony, the policy underlying
the Convention-according to the reasoning in Chromalloy-is expressed
more legitimately and effectively by the contravening provisions of
national law.'9
The dichotomy between the rhetoric and result of Chromalloy not
only generates confusion, but it also engendered a variety of critical
reactions. Proponents of the opinion saw Chromalloy as adding to the
autonomy of international commercial arbitration by insulating the
process from arbitrary national idiosyncrasies on arbitration:
17. On the one hand, the Convention both symbolizes and embodies the principles and
policies of a "world" law on arbitration. The consistent interpretation and uniform application of
the Convention by national courts has generated a body of transborder law that sustains the nearly
conclusive presumption of enforceability for international arbitral awards. On the other hand, the
language of the Convention provides a role for the application of national law in the enforcement
of awards. The title of the Convention is itself illustrative of the point. It refers to "foreign"
(rather than "international," "transborder," or "anational") awards. The term "foreign awards,"
which was meant to distinguish Convention awards from their domestic counterparts, reflects the
traditional choice-of-law methodology that influenced the drafting of the Convention. Although
the Convention now applies to the enforcement of international or anational awards, there is
nothing in its original conception that would indicate that it would experience such a
transformation.
Moreover, the text of the Convention contains numerous express and implied references to
national law. For example, Article II(1) implies that the defense to the enforcement of an
arbitration agreement on the basis of subject matter inarbitrability is to be defined by reference to
the national law of the contracting state. Article V contains a host of references to national law:
defining the parties' capacity to contract ([l][a]); regulating the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal or the conduct of the arbitral proceedings ([1][d]); providing the grounds for setting aside
the award ([1][e]); or providing the basis for nonenforcement on the grounds of inarbitrability or
a violation of public policy ([2][a][b]). To achieve the broadest possible acceptance of the
Convention and to promote its worldwide ratification, the drafters gave national law a
fundamental role in the application of the Convention's rules on the enforcement of awards.
18. See generally Chromalloy, 939 F Supp. at 907.
19. See id
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By limiting the ability of courts in the countries of origin to thwart
enforcement abroad through the use of their nullification powers, the
court's decision sends a message to business, governments, and arbitrators
that they can rely on international arbitration for final and binding
resolution of the merits of disputes.20
Critics disapproved of the court's disregard of treaty obligations and the
opinion's potential for creating inconsistencies in enforcement:
"Enforcing set-aside awards may result in the coexistence of two
conflicting awards concerning the same issues between the same parties,
and thus violate the intended uniformity of the Convention and damage
the image of international commercial arbitration." 2'
A leading international arbitration expert agreed with the court's
analysis because of its convergence with the transborder reality of arbitral
practice. In his view, the Chromalloy court correctly construes the
Convention as establishing a permissive set of guidelines for the
enforcement of awards:
I propose here to demonstrate that the leading commentator on the New
York Convention, Prof. Van den Berg, is wrong when he contends that
Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention precludes the enforcement of
an award set aside in its country of origin. The fact is that courts of a State
bound by the Convention cannot violate it by enforcing a foreign award.
Rather, a violation would occur if such a court were to refuse enforcement
in the absence of one of the limited exceptions defined in Article V(1).
This brings us to a core objective of the New York Convention: to free
the international arbitral process from the domination of the law of the
place of arbitration.22
Moreover, other national courts have espoused a similar
interpretation of the Convention. For example, the Paris Court of
Appeals upheld a lower court decision granting enforcement to the
Chromalloy arbitral award in France.23 The court reasoned that, under the
1982 Franco-Egyptian Treaty of Judicial Cooperation, domestic French
law applied pursuant to article VII of the Convention.24 In matters of
enforcement, French law (which does not include foreign annulment of
the award as a ground for nonenforcement) is less restrictive than the
Convention. Apparently, French courts have endorsed this position in
20. Gary H. Sampliner, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards After Annulment in
Their Country of Origin, I 1 MEALEY'S INT'LARB. REP. 22,28 (1996).
21. Hamid G. Gharavi, Chromalloy: Another Vew, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 21, 23
(1997).
22. Jan Paulsson, Rediscovering the N.Y Convention: Further Reflections on
Chromalloy, 12 MEALEY'S INT'LARB. REP. 20,24 (1997) (emphasis added).
23. See Chromalloy Award Survives Challenge, 12 MEALEY's INT'LARB. REP. 5 (1997).
24. See generally id.
19981
TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW
other cases. According to one critic of Chromalloy, "[f]or more than a
decade, French courts have held that the setting aside of a foreign arbitral
award in the rendering country is not a ground for refusing enforce[ment]
of the award in France."' Replying to the proponents of the decision, this
commentator pointedly stated that "[t]he fact that the award was also
enforced in France does not make Chromalloy immune from criticism.
26
II. THE TOYS "R" Us OPINION
In Alghanim v. Toys "R" Us, the Second Circuit also addressed the
question of the role of the FAA under the Convention.27 The court held
that the grounds under the FAA Section 10 can supplement article V of
the Convention as long as they do not conflict with the Convention. 8 The
rule of "non-conflicting overlap," however, only applies to Convention
awards that are rendered abroad. For Convention awards rendered in the
United States, the FAA grounds can apply to matters of enforcement
under the Convention's setting aside procedure regardless of the possible
conflict between the FAA and the Convention. The Second Circuit's
disposition in Toys "R" Us appears to conflict not only with the
Convention's general anational character and transborder objectives, but
also with the enforcement policy endorsed by the D.C. Circuit in
Chromalloy.
In November 1982, Toys "R" Us entered into an agreement with
Alghanim & Sons in which it granted the privately-owned Kuwalti
business a limited right to open Toys "R" Us stores and use its trademarks
in Kuwait and in several other Middle Eastern countries. Pursuant to the
agreement, Alghanim opened four toy stores-all of them in Kuwait and
only one of which constituted a typical Toys "R" Us outlet. From 1982 to
1993, Alghanim's operation of the stores resulted in nearly $7 million in
losses. In 1991 and 1992, the parties attempted to renegotiate the
transaction: Alghanim wanted Toys "R" Us to assume greater
responsibility for capital expenditures, an undertaking that Toys "R" Us
was unwilling to accept. In July 1992, Toys "R" Us sent Alghanim a
notice of nonrenewal, stating that the parties' agreement would terminate
on January 31, 1993. Alghanim alleged that the notice was late and that,
as a result, the term of the agreement was extended for another two years
(until January 16, 1995).29
25. Gharavi, supra note 21, at 25 n.8.
26. Hamid G. Gharavi, The Legal Inconsistencies of Chromalloy, 12 MEALEY'S INT'L
ARB. REP. 21, 22 (1997).
27. See Alghanim &Sons v. Toys "R" Us (Toys 'R" Us), 126F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1997).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 17.
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After a number of unsuccessful attempts to settle their differences,
the parties went to arbitration as provided in the contract. Specifically, in
December 1993, Toys "R" Us initiated an American Arbitration
Association (AAA) arbitration, seeking a ruling that the Toys "R" Us-
Alghanim agreement terminated on December 31, 1993. Alghanim
counterclaimed for breach of contract. The arbitrator denied Toys "R"
Us' request for a declaratory judgment and agreed with Alghanim's
breach of contract claim. After proceedings that lasted nearly two years,
the arbitrator awarded Alghanim $46 million plus interest for lost profits.
The arbitrator's findings and legal conclusions were set out in an
extensive opinion. The arbitration was conducted and the award rendered
in New York.
30
Alghanim petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York to confirm the award under the Convention. Toys "R" Us
argued that the award should be vacated under the FAA because it was
irrational and in manifest disregard of the law and the terms of the parties'
agreement. The district court agreed with Toys "R" Us that the FAA was
applicable and "the Convention and the FAA afford[ed] overlapping
coverage. ' 31 It ruled, however, that Toys "R" Us' objections to the
enforcement of the award were without merit. The district court then
confirmed the award.
On appeal, the Second Circuit addressed the question of the
"overlapping coverage" between the New York Arbitration Convention
and the FAA. First, it concluded that the Convention was clearly
applicable to the enforcement of the award. The transaction giving rise to
the arbitration and the award was unequivocally "non-domestic" in
character because it involved parties of different nationalities and contract
performance principally abroad. The statutory standard (9 U.S.C. § 202)
and the interpretative decisional law among federal circuits 32 made the
"Convention's applicability ... clear.
' 33
Second, the Second Circuit recognized that, under U.S. law, the
grounds in article V of the Convention are the exclusive means for setting
aside an international or "non-domestic" arbitral award. The FAA may
supplement the Convention in such cases, but only "to the extent that [the
FAA] is not in conflict with ... the Convention.... " This rule of
nonconflicting application applies to both the statutory and nonstatutory
30. See id. at 18.
31. See id.
32. See Bergeson v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983); Jain v. de Mere,
51 E3d 686 (7th Cir. 1995).
33. See Alghanim &Sons, 126 E3d at 19.
34. Id. at 20.
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grounds contained in Section 10 of the FAA. According to the court,
when the "application of the FAA's implied grounds" "are in conflict"
with the Convention, they are "precluded." 35  Therefore, only
nonconflicting overlap is possible. The court acknowledged that this
position is well-settled in the decisional law, including in its own
precedent: 36  "There is now considerable caselaw holding that, in an
action to confirm an award rendered in, or under the law of, a foreign
jurisdiction, the grounds for relief enumerated in Article V of the
Convention are the only grounds available for setting aside an arbitral
award."
37
This well-settled position coincides with the purpose of the
Convention to establish, in all signatory states (which now number 112), a
uniform regime for the enforcement of international or foreign arbitral
awards.38 It is generally recognized that the Convention creates a strong
presumption of enforceability by providing for narrow grounds of judicial
supervision and by excluding judicial review of the merits of arbitral
awards.39 The nonstatutory grounds under Section Ten (irrationality,
capricious and arbitrary awards, manifest disregard of the law, violations
of public policy) are derived from the federal decisional law on domestic
U.S. labor arbitration.' They deal with the special circumstances of that
form of arbitration, in which labor arbitrators interpret collective
bargaining agreements and federal labor law. They have a variable status
among the federal circuits, and make possible (in theory, at least) the
judicial scrutiny of the merits of arbitral determinations.4' Although these
grounds, as interpreted, usually pose little serious challenge to the
enforcement of domestic arbitral awards, their particularly domestic
character and their tolerance for judicial merits review make them
inapposite for application in the context of the enforcement of
international or foreign arbitral awards. On this score, the nonstatutory
grounds conflict with the Convention and-according to the court's
reasoning-should be preempted by the Convention's exclusive
application.
Third, the Second Circuit, however, noted the special circumstances
of the Toys "R" Us award, circumstances that took the case out of the
35. Id.
36. See id. See generally Bergeson, 710 F.2d 928. See also Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Socit6 G~nrale de l'Industrie du Papier, 508 F2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
37. Alghanim, 126 .3d at 20.
38. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 4, at 382.
39. See id. at 384-85.
40. See id. ch. 8.
41. See id.
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scope of the foregoing framework of applicable rules.42 The arbitration
took place and the award was rendered in New York. Because of its
rendition in the United States, the nondomestic award in Toys "R" Us
triggered the application of article V(1)(e) of the Convention. Under the
relevant language of article V(1)(e), a Convention award can be "set aside
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under
the law of which, that award was made."43 According to the court, article
V(1)(e), therefore, allows for the application of the FAA in an action to
set aside such an award: 'We read Article V(1)(e) of the Convention to
allow a court in the country under whose law the arbitration was
conducted to apply domestic arbitral law, in this case the FAA, to a
motion to set aside or vacate that arbitral award.
' 44
The court assembled support for its position from federal decisional
law, foreign judicial practice under the Convention, and scholarly
commentators. As the court acknowledged, few, if any, other federal
courts have confronted the question of article V(1)(e) "head-on" and the
court strained to find precedent for its construction of the text. It cited
Spector v. Torenburg45 as directly on point for the same proposition, and it
also attempted to forge an alliance between its reasoning and the ruling in
Chromalloy.46 Chromalloy, however, seems to be directly at odds with
the policy implications of the doctrine elaborated by the Second Circuit.
Moreover, the court's survey of various commentators and of the practice
of foreign courts is selective and falls to emphasize the problematic
character of the language of article V(1)(e) to the attainment of the
Convention's objectives.
It is true, as the court states, that: "There appears to be no dispute
among ... [scholarly commentators and 'sister signatories to the
Convention'] that an action to set aside an international arbitral award, as
contemplated by Article V(1)(e), is controlled by the domestic law of the
rendering state."47 It is also accurate to observe that "many commentators
and foreign courts have concluded that an action to set aside an award can
be brought only under the domestic law of the arbitral forum, and can
never be made under the Convention."" Or, that: "The Convention
provides no restraint whatsoever on the control functions of local courts at
42. See Alghanim, 126 F3d at 23.
43. l1 at 20.
44. Id. at 21.
45. 852 F Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
46. See Alghanim, 126 F.3d at 21.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 22.
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the seat of arbitration."' The court is entirely correct in its final
conclusion on this question:
From the plain language and history of the Convention, it is thus apparent
that a party may seek to vacate or set aside an award in the state in which,
or under the law of which, the award is rendered. Moreover, the language
and history of the Convention make it clear that such a motion is to be
governed by domestic law of the rendering state, despite the fact that the
award is nondomestic within the meaning of the Convention....5s
The court's analysis fails to consider that most, if not all,
commentators view article V(1)(e) as a domestic law intrusion into the
international regime for the enforcement of transborder arbitral awards.
The availability of article V(1)(e) makes the practice of international
commercial arbitration hazardous and can render the enforcement regime
of the Convention dysfunctional in some cases. Under the language of
the provision, some or all of the disruptive choice-of-law problems that
the Convention intended to remedy re-emerge and confound the aim of
creating a unitary transborder framework for enforcement.
In an excerpt cited by the court, the leading scholar on the
Convention states, in regard to article V(1)(e), that "the grounds for
refusal of enforcement under the Convention may indirectly be extended
to include all kinds of particularities of the arbitration law of the country
of origin. This might undermine the limitative character of the grounds
for refusal listed in Article V ... and thus decrease the degree of
uniformity existing under the Convention.",5' Another commentator cited
by the court also focuses upon the procedural perils of the provision:
If the scope of judicial review in the rendering state extends beyond the
other six defenses allowed under the New York Convention, the losing
party's opportunity to avoid enforcement is automatically enhanced: The
losing party can first attempt to derail the award on appeal on grounds that
would not be permitted elsewhere during enforcement proceedings.
52
In other words, article V(1)(e) allows a disappointed party to forum-shop
and to delay by triggering the application of the local law of the place of
rendition. Further, having the award set aside at the place of rendition
could render the award unenforceable in all signatory jurisdictions. In
effect, the provision can permit such a party to escape and undermine the
very enforcement regime the Convention establishes.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 23.
51. Id. at 21.
52. Id. at 22.
[Vol. 6286
NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION
The Second Circuit could have adopted another approach to the
interpretation of article V(1)(e) in these circumstances. The "emphatic
federal policy" on arbitration, especially as it applies to matters of
international commercial arbitration, might have warranted extending the
rule of nonconflicting overlap to international awards rendered
domestically. For example, the application of restrictive domestic
provisions could have the effect of thwarting treaty obligations. Even
though the Convention itself provides for its subordination to domestic
law in some matters, the court could have viewed the language of article
V(1)(e) and other similar provisions in the Convention as historical carry-
overs-necessary to gain maximum state ratification at the time the
Convention was opened for signature in 1958. Arguably, the role of
domestic law within the Convention framework has been eclipsed by the
continuing process of ratification itself and re-evaluated by the decisional
practice of national courts. In other words, uniformly favorable and
consistent interpretation of the Convention by courts in signatory states-
expressed in part by the emergence of the UNCITRAL Model Law and
Rules on Arbitration and the enactment of national laws favoring
arbitration-have created international norms on arbitration that render
the reference to national law irrelevant and unnecessary.
In effect, the Second Circuit could have adopted a less technical
approach to the interpretation of article V(1)(e), emphasizing the
Convention's underlying policy and basic enforcement objectives. An
opinion containing such reasoning could have readily been integrated into
the federal decisional law on arbitration-more specifically, the
decisional law on the Convention. The opinion in Chromalloy prepared
the way for such a ruling. In Toys "R" Us, however, the Second Circuit
interpreted the Convention without regard to the practical consequences
of its interpretation on enforcement-seemingly, almost exclusively for
the sake of doctrinal refinement.
In addition, having the nonstatutory grounds supplement the
provisions of the Convention for the enforcement of domestically
rendered international awards generates at least a theoretical conflict
between the domestic law and the norms and objectives of the
Convention. The nonstatutory grounds provide for a form of judicial
review of the merits of arbitral awards-a defense to enforcement that
exceeds supervision for violations of domestic public policy and for the
constraints of subject matter inarbitrability. It is a form of national
judicial intervention that the Convention precludes in its stated grounds
for review and that most threatens the autonomy of international
arbitration. Arguably, even the English statutory position on the judicial
supervision of the merits of awards in a non-Convention setting is more
2871998]
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restrictive than the standard adopted by the Second Circuit. It also is
justified by a more reasoned appraisal of its need and role. 3
Finally, the court applies the nonstatutory grounds to the facts of the
case and 'swiftly' concludes that none of the arguments advanced on that
basis by Toys "R" Us even remotely warrants vacatur of the award.14 As
is characteristic of domestic litigation, the court invokes the policy of
deferential judicial review and finds that the arbitrator's determinations
are well within the bounds of legality and rationality." For example, the
court states at one point that the "[i]nterpretation of these contract terms is
within the province of the arbitrator and will not be overruled simply
because we disagree with that interpretation. 56 The complex doctrinal
reasoning applying to article V(1)(e) appears to have been elaborated to
reach the conclusion that the application of the domestic rules of
enforcement is inconsequential. It may be invigorating for courts to
discuss standard of review questions in both the domestic and
international setting, but the point of the exercise in Toys "R" Us, unlike
Chromalloy, remains elusive.
1H. CONCLUSIONS
In the final analysis, the Second Circuit may have missed an
opportunity to provide doctrinal leadership on the question of the role of
domestic law in the Convention's setting aside procedure. If the court had
held that domestic enforcement norms are inapposite under the
Convention regardless of the award's place of rendition, it could have
reinforced the autonomy of the international arbitral process and perhaps
made the setting aside procedure less likely of success in other signatory
jurisdictions. In so doing, the court could have further suggested that
article V(1)(e) only allows fundamental domestic juridical norms to be
invoked. In any event, by integrating domestic provisions into the
Convention regime, the Second Circuit dilutes and confuses the
governing international standard, creates additional potential problems for
enforcement, and makes a cohesive interpretation of the federal decisional
law on the Convention more difficult. Despite the latitude it took with
regard to the Convention and its technical language, Chromalloy appeared
at least to articulate a coherent and comprehensible policy on the
enforcement question.
53. See THOMAS CARBONNEAU, 1998 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY
ch. VII (1998).
54. See Alghanim, 126 F.3d at 25.
55. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 4 ch. 8.
56. Alghanim, 126 F3d at 25.
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In comparing Chromalloy and the French Court of Cassation's
opinion in OTV v. Hilmarton,.7 Professor Emmanuel Gaillard concludes
that the policy generated by the decisional law "exemplif[ies] a growing
international consensus in favor of the enforcement of an arbitral award
set aside by a court at the situs of the arbitration"58 and "reflect[s] the
notion that the seat of an arbitration is not its fundamental anchor; at the
recognition and enforcement stage, the place of enforcement is
paramount .... 59 To the extent that the Second Circuit's opinion in Toys
"R" Us privileges the application of domestic law and undermines the
modem "anational" character of the Convention, it is definitely out of
keeping with the most recent transborder developments on arbitration.
Paulsson, in particular, provides eloquent and persuasive reasons for
accepting the approach employed by the Chromalloy court.60 In a recent
article, he effectively marshals historical, textual, and practical reasons for
subscribing to the methodology advanced in Chromalloy and
convincingly argues for a separate setting aside regime for international
awards. Paulsson's brief on behalf of Chromalloy would preclude his
endorsement of the Second Circuit's construction of the role of national
law in the setting aside procedure (but for its ultimate application) in Toys
"R" Us. Paulsson, I believe, would agree with the assessment of other
distinguished international lawyers, like Newman and Burrows,6 ' that
Chromalloy and Toys "R" Us are "difficult to reconcile '62 and provide for
contradistinctive interpretations of the role of national law within the
framework of the Convention and of the Convention itself.
Globalization indeed has undone the reign of what Paulsson calls the
"die-hard territorialists." 63  But, as Gharavi and other critics of
Chromalloy suggest, transborder, anational regimes leave lawyers and
clients at the mercy of the circumstantial creativity of courts and
practitioners. 64 The pragmatists argue that the solution has worked thus
far; however, it does provide for a system that operates without a
necessary level of self-discipline. Toys "R" Us underscores the fragility
of such a system in achieving the predictable and orderly administration




60. See Jan Paulsson, The Case for Disregarding LSAs (Local Standard Annulments)
under the New York Convention, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 99 (1996).
61. See Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, Setting Aside Arbitral Awards under
the New York Convention, 218 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1997).
62. See id.
63. See Paulsson, supra note 60, at 109.
64. See Hamid G. Gharavi, Enforcing Set Aside Arbitral Awards: France's Controversial
Steps Beyond the New York Convention, 6 J. TRAS. L. & PoL'Y 93 (1996).
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of transborder justice. Despite the political difficulties associated with the
enterprise, there is no doubt that the Convention needs to be amended to
reflect the contemporary realities of the international commercial
arbitration process. It is difficult to continue to depend upon the courts'
willingness and ability to graft implied content onto the Convention to
safeguard the interests of international commerce. Toys "R" Us
demonstrates that even well-intentioned and sympathetic courts can
sometimes produce confounding doctrinal results.
Finally, it is also curious that globalization-a process which is now
well-established-is generating a form of arbitral internationalism that
ultimately reverts to the content and rule of national law. The questions
raised in Chromalloy and Toys "R" Us were res nova. The classical
65federal court opinions on the Convention, which addressed initial
problems of interpretation at a time when the Convention had barely left
the orbit of national legal constraints, steadfastly segregated the
international and domestic dimensions of arbitration law precisely to
avoid compromising the transnational significance of the Convention.
Chromalloy and Toys "R" Us point us in a different direction that, at the
very least, privileges the content of the U.S. domestic law of arbitration
and, as a consequence, de-emphasize (some would say, undermine) the
transborder and anational stature of the Convention. Such a methodology
may attest to the universal harmonization of arbitration law, but national
law under this new approach is used to supplant a would-be deficiency of
the international regime. One wonders what perils may be lurking in the
shadows of this new approach and what form of globalization is being
contemplated when ultimate regulatory authority is attributed to domestic
law? A more forthright statement of the transborder and anational stature
of the Convention might assuage many of the anxieties that are generated
by the courts' reliance upon the domestic provisions of the FAA to
resolve the enforcement questions raised in Chromalloy and Toys "R" Us.
65. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 4.
290 [Vol. 6
